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Abstract
There has been increased focus on atrocity prevention and the preventative elements 
associated with Pillar ii of the Responsibility to Protect. Policymakers and academics 
have offered a range of short-term preventative measures available so that the 
international community can better fulfil its Pillar ii responsibilities. This article 
challenges this current R2P thinking by arguing that its short-termism insufficiently 
focuses on de-escalation of risk within already present cycles of violence while dealing 
superficially with long-term causes and the ways in which the international community 
is a contributing factor in underwriting systemic and structural determinants of 
violence which erode state resilience against mass atrocity. As an alternative, this 
article examines a number of ways in which key actors of the international community 
contribute to determinants of mass violence and further offer recommendations for 
how they could better discharge their long-term preventative responsibilities by first 
reforming their own practices.
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‘I prioritize prevention, as I believe all of us should do’
– sg antonio guterres, 2017
Prevention of atrocities is a crucial part of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), 
evidenced by discussions within and outside academia, including the UN 
Security Council.1 This commitment to preventing mass atrocities includes – at 
least rhetorically – both long-term ‘root cause’ prevention and more short-term 
‘operational’ prevention. Prevention concerns both the state that has the primary 
responsibility to protect its own population (Pillar i) as well as the international 
community in its secondary assistance role (Pillar ii and iii). Despite commit-
ments to prevention expressed by several UN Secretaries-General, there has been 
limited analysis in R2P literature of the international community’s secondary 
assistance role in systemic, root cause prevention under Pillar ii commitments.2
This article seeks to fill this gap in the atrocity prevention literature associated 
with R2P by critiquing the understanding of the role of the international com-
munity in atrocity prevention under Pillar ii, particularly its role in systemic and 
structural root cause prevention. It argues that R2P documents, and the doctrine’s 
supporters, fail to fully appreciate the ways in which the international community 
is a contributing factor in underwriting determinants of violence (which include 
or increase risks of atrocities) across the globe in a way that undermines and con-
tradicts what is needed for root cause prevention under Pillar ii. R2P thus demon-
strates an impoverished understanding of how the international community can 
actually help undertake its responsibilities in the R2P framework.
The article is presented in four sections. Section 1 demonstrates that R2P’s 
prevention characteristics under Pillar ii have a short-term operational focus 
rather than a long-term root cause focus, both within R2P documents and 
within wider commentary. In doing so, this section challenges current thinking 
on the R2P and existing paradigms on prevention. Section 2 relates this time-
scale problem to R2P’s view of troubled states as responsible for root causes 
versus the international community as responsible for short-term operational 
prevention, illustrating why this understanding of differentiated responsibility 
1 UNSC Res. 1674, 28 April 2006; UNSC Res. 1894, 11 November 2009; UN Secretary-
General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Accountability for Prevention, 
A/71/1016–S/2017/556, 10 August 2017.
2 Garrett W. Brown and Alexandra Bohm, ‘Introducing Jus Ante Bellum as a Cosmopolitan 
Approach to Humanitarian Intervention’, European Journal of International Relations, 
22(4): 725–748 (2016); Robin Dunford and Michael Neu, ‘The Responsibility to Protect in a 
World of already Existing Intervention’, European Journal of International Relations, 25(4): 
1080–1102 (2019), (online) 21 April 2019, https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066119842208, accessed 
15 September 2019.
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underplays the role of the international community in risk escalation. Section 
3 demonstrates some ways that the relationship between internal state respon-
sibility (Pillar i) and international responsibility (Pillar ii and iii) can hinder 
rather than help state resilience against mass atrocity under a state’s Pillar i 
responsibilities. In other words, we argue that the international community 
can have direct and indirect effect on escalating risk factors which underwrite 
the four atrocity crimes. From this, Section 4 considers, beyond R2P’s current 
assumptions, what some of the international community’s prevention meas-
ures might be. By doing so, this article reimagines prevention in a way that 
emancipates the international community from its current stalled role and 
thinking regarding preventative measures so as to demonstrate a more effec-
tive concern for individuals at risk of mass atrocities.
However, before beginning it is necessary to set the conceptual parameters. 
First, by reference to the international community we denote its common use 
in International Relations as often presented in R2P literature, namely, a group 
of powerful states and their associating allies who are able to directly shape 
geopolitics, R2P norm compliance, and influence Bretton Woods instruments 
in attempts to advance a collective position. In the literature this community 
has largely been represented by Western countries, but it can also include per-
manent members of the UN Security Council when mutual interests align or 
when collective action decisions are needed in relation to peace and security. 
Second, we define systemic determinants as global system level determinants 
perpetuated and reinforced by key members of the international community, 
such as resource distribution, political alliances, trade relations, economic 
structures, and reinforced historical legacies, which can amplify the risk of 
increased conflict and mass violence at state and regional levels.3 Although 
there is often a distinction made between systemic prevention and structural 
prevention within the conflict prevention literature,4 we understand these as 
having overlapping elements and therefore that they amalgamate key struc-
tural considerations, such as notions of structural violence, as interwoven and 
complimentary to long-term systemic approaches. In this way, unlike many 
traditional discussions about structural prevention,5 we do not understand it 
as limited to state structures and risk, maintaining that many local structures 
3 United Nations General Assembly, Progress Report of the Prevention of Armed Conflict, 
A/60/891, 18 July 2006, (5).
4 Charles Call and Susanna Campbell, ‘Is Prevention the Answer’, Daedalus, 147(1): 64–77 
(2018).
5 Alexander George and Jane Holl, The Warning-Response Problem and Missed Opportunities 
in Preventive Diplomacy (New York: Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1997).
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are in fact greatly influenced by, and interlinked with, external socio-economic 
systemic practices as part of a nexus of prevention determinants. Third, as will 
be suggested below, there are a number of potential overlaps between research 
on R2P mass atrocity prevention and those found in the conflict and civil war 
prevention literature. Furthermore, there is rich prevention research associ-
ated with specific crimes, such as genocide. What is surprising, however, is 
that these literatures do not always speak across and reinforce each other, nor 
are they often synthesised within R2P prevention research, which we believe 
undermines heuristic opportunities. To be clear, our aim in this article is not 
to develop these links. Our effort here is merely to highlight this lacuna while 
more directly challenging why some R2P scholars have tended to view mass 
atrocity prevention research as something uniquely different to the preven-
tion of mass violence writ large.6 In making this point, the aim is to argue that 
current R2P debates fail to fully appreciate the ways in which the international 
community is a contributing factor in underwriting systemic determinants of 
violence (which include or increase risks of atrocities) across the globe in a 
way that undermines and contradicts what is needed for sufficient prevention 
under Pillar ii.
1 Prevention within R2P – Short-term Thinking
Prevention, according to Alex Bellamy and Edward Luck, ‘is the single most 
important element of the R2P because it is morally, politically, financially, and 
prudentially better to prevent atrocity crimes than to react to stop them once 
underway’.7 However, despite such a recognition, the R2P (as well as advocates 
like Bellamy) undertake only a limited and cursory investigation of long-term 
prevention. Furthermore, where long-term root causes are identified, the pre-
ventive recommendations for action remain short-term and malnourished, 
primarily focused on reforming the national/domestic structure in which a 
population is at risk. Consequently, there is limited consideration of the extent 
to which global systemic factors influence long-term root causes of mass vio-
lence in general, and those instances of mass violence which meet the legal 
threshold for atrocity crimes in particular. There is also limited acknowledge-
ment of the role of the international community in global systemic factors that 
6 Kirsten Ainley, ‘From Atrocity Crimes to Human Rights: Expanding the Focus of the 
Responsibility to Protect’, Global Responsibility to Protect, 9(3): 243–266 (2017).
7 Alex J. Bellamy and Edward Luck, The Responsibility to Protect: From Promise to Practice 
(Cambridge: Policy Press, 2018), p. 140.
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underwrite violence. Below we identify four prevention weaknesses within the 
R2P lexicon.
1.1 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty: 
Limited Determinants
The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (iciss) 
recognised in 2001 the existence of short-term conflict triggers and more 
deeply-rooted structural causes. These root causes include poverty, political 
repression, and uneven distribution of resources8 and are problems within the 
structure of a society, which predispose a society to violence if they remain 
unaddressed. The report urged states to become more serious at addressing 
root causes of the problems that put populations at risk,9 because ignoring 
root causes is to address the symptoms rather than the causes of conflicts.10 
iciss endorsed the Secretary-General’s prior report on conflict prevention11 
and the importance of long-term strategies to address structural causal fac-
tors. This conflict prevention report refers to the higher costs of military inter-
ventions compared to preventive strategies, and emphasises the importance 
of structural causes of conflict such as development and equality problems.12 
Problems at a more global systemic level are also loosely identified within the 
iciss report, such as Cold War debts and uneven terms of trade, and poverty 
was suggested to be tied to global interactions between states.13
Having set out some of the root causes of violence, the iciss then consid-
ered what prevention tools could address these issues. It suggested democratic 
capacity building, fact finding (political), development assistance, better terms 
of trade and market access, as well as International Monetary Fund (imf) 
rewards and sanctions (economic), rule of law promotion (legal), and security 
sector reform and peacekeeping operations (military).14 Some of these tools 
do clearly relate to root causes, such as poverty and inequality. Nevertheless, 
8 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (iciss), The 
Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa: IDRC, 2001), p. 22.
9 ibid., p. 19.
10 ibid., p. 23.
11 UN, Prevention of Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General, A/55/985–S/2001/574, 7 
June 2001.
12 ibid., pp. 2, 7 and 25. Bellamy notes that Annan viewed R2P as part of conflict prevention, 
whereas iciss viewed conflict prevention as part of R2P and Ban Ki-moon thought of 
prevention of R2P crimes as entirely separate from conflict prevention. See Alex J. 
Bellamy, ‘Mass Atrocities and Armed Conflict: Links, Distinctions, and Implications for the 
Responsibility to Prevent’, Stanley Foundation Policy Analysis Brief, February 2011.
13 iciss, The Responsibility to Protect, p. 20.
14 ibid., p. 23.
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in many ways, recognition of these conflict causes represents ‘business as 
usual’ in their basic assumptions about how to deal with atrocity crimes. This 
is because none of these measures fully address the complex barriers to devel-
opment and equality identified by iciss as a recognised determinant of vio-
lence. By and large, these measures also assume the international community 
is a benign actor that can provide prevention assistance, rather than looking 
at the international community’s active systemic role in perpetuating poverty, 
repression, and uneven resource distribution.15 The iciss report did make a 
direct, though brief, link between international community actions and root 
determinants of violence (including Cold War debts, unequal terms of trade 
and market access) which increase domestic inequality and resource scarcity, 
and discourage the socio-economic development of many people within poor 
states.16 But this was a very brief paragraph embedded deep within a 108-page 
report. To pick one example from iciss’s list, we challenge the idea that the 
imf’s role in mass atrocity crimes is as a neutral actor that can provide rewards 
or sanctions for states who protect or put at risk their populations.17 Instead, 
as we discuss in Section 3, the imf’s equal ability to increase instability, unrest, 
and disenfranchisement should be understood to better situate its potential 
relationship to violence in general and atrocity crimes in particular.
While the Secretary-General’s yearly reports show a strong rhetorical com-
mitment to prevention aligned to Pillar ii commitments,18 there are two par-
ticular shortcomings in these reports which we wish to highlight. First, the 
time frames envisaged in the reports demonstrate that long-term structural 
prevention measures are significantly restrained compared to short-term 
measures. Second, the reports underplay the relationship between state resil-
ience and international community assistance and the complex global–local 
relationship that plagues international community efforts under the interna-
tional community assistance pillar of R2P. This article develops this last point 
later, for now the aim is to better highlight this lacuna in R2P thinking.
1.2 Secretary-General’s Reports: Impoverished Time Frames
At times, the reports’ description of something as being long-term is in fact still 
quite short-term. For example, the 2013 State Responsibility report comments 
15 Brown and Bohm, ‘Jus Ante Bellum’.
16 iciss, The Responsibility to Protect, p. 23.
17 ibid., p. 24.
18 UN, Prevention of Armed Conflict; see also UN, A Vital and Enduring Commitment: 
Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Report of the Secretary-General, 
A/69/981–S/2015/500, 13 July 2015; UN, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Report of 
the Secretary-General, A/63/677, 12 January 2009, p. 2.
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that in Rwanda, atrocities ‘started in hate speech, discrimination and margin-
alisation not in the massacres themselves’.19 Although the report is correctly 
trying to point to a more long-term view of atrocities than the moment that the 
perpetrators started killing, its example that the Rwandan atrocities started 
at the point of hate speech rather than the point where participants took up 
arms is still too short-term in the context of understanding the causes of the 
genocide. As will be explored further below, there is considerable evidence to 
suggest that the causes of the genocide had far longer historical roots and that 
many of those causes were influenced by key actors often associated with ‘res-
cue’ responsibilities in the international community.20 Moreover, it is impor-
tant to note that this undervaluation of long-term drivers to mass atrocity is 
not limited to analyses of Rwanda alone.21
In addition, many of the reports refer to both short-term and long-term 
causes and preventive measures, whether using these exact terms or using 
similar concepts, such as ‘structural’ versus ‘operational prevention’, or ‘root 
causes’ versus ‘triggers’.22 Even the 2012 report on response mentioned the 
need for structural prevention to happen earlier rather than later.23 But, like 
iciss, the identification of long-term causes is often matched to prevention 
measures that are actually quite short-term. For example, several reports men-
tion the root causes of uneven growth and uneven distribution of resources, 
poverty, inequality – and the need to implement welfare safety-net measures.24 
Chronic under-development does not cause atrocities directly, but the reports 
do at times make the link between limited resources, civil strife, and increasing 
strains between communities.25 But the corresponding view of what the inter-
national community can do to address these long-term causes does not tackle 
19 UN, Responsibility to Protect: State Responsibility and Prevention: Report of the Secretary-
General, A/67/929–S/2013/399, 9 July 2013, p. 7, para. 30.
20 Peter Uvin, Aiding Violence: Development Enterprise in Rwanda (Boulder CO: Kumarian 
Press, 1998); Mahmood Mamdani, Saviors and Survivors: Darfur, Politics, and the War on 
Terror (New York: Doubleday, 2010); Graham Harrison, ‘Onwards and Sidewards? The 
Curious Case of the Responsibility to Protect and Mass Violence in Africa’, Journal of 
Intervention and Statebuilding, 10(1): 143–161 (2016).
21 Ainley, ‘From Atrocity Crimes’.
22 UN, The Role of Regional and Subregional Arrangements in Implementing the Responsibility 
to Protect: Report of the Secretary-General, A/65/877–S/2011/393, 27 June 2011, p. 7; UN, 
Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Response: Report of the Secretary-General, 
A/66/874–S/2012/578, 25 July 2012, p. 3; UN, Fulfilling Our Collective Responsibility: 
International Assistance and the Responsibility to Protect: Report of the Secretary-General, 
A/68/947–S/2014/449, 11 July 2014, pp. 3–4.
23 UN, Timely and Decisive Response, p. 7.
24 UN, Implementing, pp. 19–20; UN, State Responsibility, pp. 11, 14; UN, Accountability, p. 5.
25 UN, Implementing, p. 19; UN, State Responsibility, p. 11.
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the problematic global system that benefits wealthy countries to the disadvan-
tage of poorer ones and that contributes to poverty, inequality, and weak state 
structures. Instead, international community assistance is recommended to be 
delivered in the form of capacity building in weak states,26 putting pressure 
on actors not to commit atrocities by signing up to relevant international trea-
ties, and to provide education and training in areas such as good governance.27 
Some of these measures are very short-term compared to the causes they are 
expected to address, such as putting pressure on potential perpetrators. Other 
measures might be longer term, such as capacity building. Nevertheless, none 
of these measures really address root causes such as poverty and inequality, 
even compared to iciss’s few lines addressed to the international commu-
nity’s insistence on repayments of Cold War debts and unfair terms of trade 
imposed upon under-developed countries.28 As a result, this picture of causes 
and solutions is mismatched in terms of the times that the causal factors start 
versus the time that preventive measures are encouraged to be deployed. It is 
also mismatched in how blame and responsibility are situated.
1.3 Secretary-General’s Reports: Undervaluing the Systemic-Structural 
Relationship
Many reports identify weak state structures as a significant cause of atroci-
ties, in addition to armed conflicts or instability, a record of human rights or 
international humanitarian law violations and economic deprivation, and the 
resulting inability to manage diversity constructively.29 According to these 
reports, weak state structures mean that the state is not resilient, and is unable 
to ensure respect for international legal treaties on human rights. Alternatively, 
a resilient state has diversity within its judiciary, military, and police, and the 
international community’s role is said to be in helping build state resilience, 
or helping with early warning mechanisms.30 The international community 
assistance, as envisaged by the 2014 report and repeated in others, is to fix 
26 UN, Implementing, pp. 15–17; UN, Fulfilling Our Collective Responsibility: International 
Assistance, p. 4; UN, A Vital and Enduring Commitment, pp. 9–12.
27 UN, Implementing, p. 16; UN, State Responsibility, pp. 7, 35; UN, Fulfilling Our Collective 
Responsibility: International Assistance. p. 8.
28 iciss, Responsibility to Protect, p. 20.
29 For example, see UN, Implementing, p. 10; UN, Timely and Decisive Response, p. 6; UN, 
Fulfilling Our Collective Responsibility: International Assistance; UN, Responsibility to 
Protect: From Early Warning to Early Action, A/72/884–S/2018/525, 1 June 2018, p. 9.
30 UN, State Responsibility; UN, A Vital and Enduring Commitment; UN, From Early Warning to 
Early Action, p. 3 para. 4, p. 5 para. 12.
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problem structures within the target state,31 via educating national authori-
ties, by disseminating standards of good governance, and the promotion of 
human rights and international humanitarian law.32 But, as mentioned above, 
this picture of the international community’s role does not address what inter-
national community actors are already doing to seriously damage state struc-
tures, nor how the global system is structured in a way that can be damaging 
to resilience within state structures. Any acknowledgement of the relevance 
of long-term root cause prevention is not followed with discussion of how the 
international community could fulfil its own long-term commitments beyond 
assisting national structural resilience (for example, its influence on risk deter-
minants of violence like uneven growth and resource competition).
Even when taking a long-term view of root causes, the reports reflect the 
assumption that the state is the site of the problem, and that the international 
community is the site of solutions. Yet structural problems such as an armed 
conflict/instability/record of violations do not come from nowhere, emanat-
ing from a blank canvas of international relations and domestic politics with 
only the problem state to blame. These root cause risk factors themselves have 
causes which are enmeshed in that country’s relationship with international 
community actors. While the 2016 report recognises the ability of external 
actors to influence atrocities, such as through arms sales, and recommends 
combined local, national, and global action, there is no vision of what this 
might entail, particularly at the international level.33
One particular example of this problematic conception of the system-struc-
ture relationship can be seen in relation to overseas development assistance 
(oda). Recognising that oda is not perfect, the 2009 Implementation report 
does suggest that increasing oda to the bottom billion, in a manner which 
does not worsen tensions, could help to reduce crimes and violence through 
capacity building, because often the poorest individuals lack the capacity to 
resist oppression and violence.34 This may seem promising, in that develop-
ment assistance is an acknowledgement of a more long-term root cause of 
violence that results from poverty and inequality. But this treatment of oda 
31 UN, Fulfilling Our Collective Responsibility: International Assistance, p. 4.
32 ibid., p. 8.
33 UN, Mobilizing Collective Action: The Next Decade of the Responsibility to Protect: Report of 
the Secretary-General, A/70/999–S/2016/620, 22 July 2016, pp. 9–11.
34 UN, Implementing, p. 19; see also UN, Fulfilling Our Collective Responsibility: International 
Assistance, p. 8. Section 3 returns to this to examine in more detail what the international 
community actually does with overseas development aid and whether this fosters tensions 
and whether it does enable capacity building and promote resilience in problem states.
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repeats the iciss tendency to view internal problems in the weak state as the 
cause of atrocities, and to view international community activities as having 
the potential to help prevent these cases. What is lacking is consideration of 
the international community’s role in creating/sustaining problems within the 
weak state. There is thus no consideration of international responsibility to 
cease such problematic activities as part of its prevention role.
The 2017 Implementation report also considers the interplay between 
national institutions and intergovernmental mechanisms, but again does not 
examine global systemic issues in a way that acknowledges potential respon-
sibility of the international community for the very problems it then seeks to 
prevent. Examples of accountability for prevention given in the report include 
international human rights law requirements on states not to abuse their 
own people as well as legal obligations ‘extending to root causes of atrocities, 
including persistent patterns of identity based discrimination, economic dep-
rivation and state weakness’, although the report does not explain the source 
of this legal obligation on states.35 The international community’s obligations 
are set out in relation to their obligation to prevent and punish genocide and 
respect and ensure respect for the laws of armed conflict, as well as obeying 
Security Council resolutions which refer to the R2P.36 This attempt at account-
ability is welcome but is couched only in legal terms. As a result, the report fails 
to address key behaviours by the international community that are not unlaw-
ful, yet are clearly unhelpful, in addressing atrocity determinants. As will be 
illustrated later, these behaviours often include the approving of questionable 
arms sales, the support or ignoring of ‘friendly’ authoritarians, and/or the pur-
suit of economic interests despite predictable and potentially adverse effects 
on domestic stability.
Section 3 will explain the missing links between global systemic and state 
structural problems evident in these reports, and how the international com-
munity cannot effectively ‘help’ fix state structural problems without also 
limiting contributing determinants that derive from the international com-
munity’s role in global structures. What is important to note here, however, as 
a major failing of the R2P discourse, is that where structural factors for preven-
tion are mentioned, they are mentioned in terms of reforming a state’s internal 
structures organisationally, versus how the international community can help 
relieve external pressures upon internal structures by outside forces. Indeed, 
35 UN, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Accountability for Prevention, 
A/71/1016–S/2017/556, 10 August 2017, p. 5.
36 ibid.
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Stephen McLoughlin notes that it is problematic to leave the definition of root 
causes, and their appropriate responses, to the ‘rescuers’ rather than giving 
voice to the potential victims.37
1.4 Secretary-General’s Reports: Developments on Risk Factors
Following the 2015 report on implementation, the Secretary-General endorsed 
a Framework of Analysis developed by his Special Advisors for R2P, dealing spe-
cifically with risks specific to mass atrocities, rather than risks related to other 
forms of violence.38 The Framework of Analysis echoes those risks mentioned 
in the State Responsibility and International Community Assistance reports,39 
referring to risk factors including armed conflict or instability, a record of past 
violations, weak state structures, motive and capacity of instigators, lack of 
local resilience, and particular triggers.40 Other research suggests mass atrocity 
risk factors of assassinations, battlefield changes, and territory takeovers – stra-
tegic issues that lead elites to consider atrocities as part of a strategic response 
to help retain power and defeat enemies.41 Others have identified risk factors 
of illegitimate regimes, economic inequality and decline.42 Mirroring many of 
the issues raised in the 2013 and 2014 Secretary-General reports, the Oxford 
Institute of Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict (elac) notes that root cause pre-
vention is often overlooked compared to ‘altering the capacity of perpetrators 
[of mass atrocities] to operate’.43 Despite this acknowledgment of long-term 
structural issues as a major determinant, elac’s list of preventive tools is then 
divided only into short-term (crises) and very short-term (imminent threats) 
37 Stephen McLoughlin, ‘Rethinking the Structural Prevention of Mass Atrocities’, Global 
Responsibility to Protect, 6(4): 407–429 (2014); Deborah Mayersen, ‘Rethinking Approaches 
to Prevention under the Responsibility to Protect’, Global Responsibility to Protect, 6(4): 
483–507 (2014).
38 UN, Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes: A Tool for Prevention (New York: United 
Nations, 2014), e.g. p. 12.
39 UN, Fulfilling Our Collective Responsibility: International Assistance.
40 UN, Framework of Analysis, p. 4.
41 Scott Straus, ‘Triggers of Mass Atrocities’, Politics and Governance, 3(3): 5–15 (2015).
42 Kathryn Gillum, ‘Evaluation of Current Risk Assessment Models for Genocide and Mass 
Atrocity’, InterAgency Journal, 8(1): 68–74 (Winter 2017); Ruben Reike, Serena Sharma, and 
Jennifer Welsh, ‘A Strategic Framework for Mass Atrocity Prevention’, acmc and Oxford 
Institute of Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict, Paper 03/2013.
43 Serena K. Sharma and Jennifer M. Welsh, ‘Operationalizing the Responsibility to Prevent’, 
Oxford Institute for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict Policy Brief, 2012, https://www.
oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/downloads/briefings/201204ELACResponsibility-to-Prevent.pdf, 
accessed 20 August 2020. See also Reike et al., A Strategic Framework’, p. 7.
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tools. There are no suggestions for operationalising prevention of the longer-
term risk factors that elac identifies.44
Thus, root causes are identified by many, but operationalisation focuses 
on short-term measures, and the international community’s role in these 
measures is one of helping lower the risk of mass atrocity crimes through 
education, persuasion, or improvement of the actors within state settings. 
These approaches to risk factors again consider both long (inequality, past 
violations) and short (capacity of instigators, triggers) term risks, but focus 
only on short-term actions that might be taken in relation to risks. They 
also focus on risks at a local or national level rather than a global level.45 Of 
course, none of these risk factors are unique to mass atrocities (as the 2018 
report notes46), nor do they necessarily always require unique measures dif-
ferent from more general violence or conflict prevention – for example, the 
presence of conflict is a risk factor for most atrocities, and war crimes (one 
of the R2P crimes) can only be committed in a situation of armed conflict. 
We return to this point in Section 2 below – for now, the point is that work 
on risk factors that are supposedly unique to atrocities, and not just any vio-
lence, pays the same lip service to long-term root cause prevention as does 
the R2P more generally.
The appreciation shown throughout recent reports of the importance of 
prevention, and acknowledgement of the need for long-term prevention at the 
early stage of a risk environment, is significant. It heralds a stronger commit-
ment to a cosmopolitan idea that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound 
of cure.47 But, as described above, these long-term risk factors are met with 
calls for what are more short-term focused solutions, with far less discussion 
of operationalising long-term prevention in the R2P literature. Discussion of 
operationalising long-term prevention, such as oda, fails to explore the prob-
lematic nature of the international community activity in relation to long-
term issues. As a result, most R2P approaches are focused on the de-escalation 
of immediate mass atrocity risks versus genuine ‘preventative’ commitments 
that address root causes as well as externally driven systemic determinants. 
The next section will consider why the importance of (and financial commit-
ment to) long-term prevention measures has been understated, and to fur-
ther present our argument in favour of a commitment to long-term systemic 
prevention.
44 Sharma and Welsh, ‘Operationalizing the Responsibility to Prevent’, p. 9.
45 See, for example, UN, From Early Warning to Early Action, p. 7.
46 UN, From Early Warning to Early Action, p. 5.
47 Brown and Bohm, ‘Jus Ante Bellum’.
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2 Why Is Long-term Global Systemic Prevention Undervalued within 
R2P
There is a false assumption underwriting the fundamental relationship between 
R2P’s focus on domestic/national problems and global international community 
solutions. Namely, long-term global systemic prevention has been predominately 
ignored in R2P because the problem of mass atrocity crime is assumed as occur-
ring internally at the local level, within the problem state, so that the international 
community is viewed as an external actor helping to change domestic struc-
tures.48 Alex Bellamy and Edward Luck typify this position, arguing that ‘the inter-
national community has only a limited capacity to prevent atrocities’ and that 
‘international action to prevent atrocity crimes is therefore best understood as an 
exercise in supporting certain actors, institutions and capacities and influencing 
behaviours’.49 Delineating this relationship further, Bellamy and Luck claim ‘the 
actors primarily responsible for determining whether or not a country will experi-
ence the horrors of atrocity crimes are those within the country itself’.50
Although Bellamy and Luck are of course technically correct in regard to 
identifying the primary agents and location of atrocity crime, we wish to chal-
lenge the assumption that the international community is a benign agent with 
only ‘limited’ involvement or capacity. Alternatively, we want to argue that rec-
ognising problems in global systems, and the international community’s long-
term relationship with problem states, helps to illustrate potential international 
community complicity in violence, including the four atrocity crimes. As a 
result, if mass atrocity prevention is indeed multifaceted, as is often suggested,51 
then a true commitment to prevention by the international community would 
require looking beyond training locals on human rights and good governance 
(what is traditionally understood as structural prevention), so as to also include 
significant long-term commitments to reforming global systems that play their 
part in preventing problem states from developing resilience to atrocities.
2.1 The Prevention-Reaction Distinction and the Problem of Blurred 
Lines
Part of the short-term focus of R2P’s prevention solutions can be explained by 
R2P’s provenance. Although the R2P is a significant development from prior 
48 Dunford and Neu, ‘Already Existing Intervention’.
49 Bellamy and Luck, From Promise to Practice, p. 42, emphasis in original.
50 ibid., p. 113.
51 Lael Brainard, Security by Other Means: Foreign Assistance, Global Poverty and American 
Leadership (Washington DC: Brookings Institute, 2007).
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humanitarian intervention debates, particularly in terms of breadth (includ-
ing prevention and rebuilding responsibilities and not just jus ad bellum ques-
tions), early R2P debates retained much of its focus on reaction.52 In the 2012 
Timely and Decisive Response report, Ban notes that an international commu-
nity measure can be both a reaction to something and a preventive measure, 
meaning that it is not necessary to define under which R2P pillar an activity 
is being undertaken. For example, preventive diplomacy, or decreasing arms 
sales to problem areas, are a response to a pattern of circumstances and seek 
to prevent a situation from worsening.53 Ban gives the examples of Kenya and 
Kyrgyzstan, where peaceful settlement measures (commissions of inquiry, 
negotiation, and mediation) were used in response to escalating tensions and 
acted to prevent outbreaks of violence.54 The 2017 Secretary-General’s report 
also played down the traditional ‘just war’ criterion (adhered to by iciss) that 
military intervention must be a last resort, arguing instead that ‘there is no need 
for a rigidly sequenced strategy or for tightly defined “triggers” for action’.55 Yet, 
although it is correct to say that an international community act can be a reac-
tion to an event and have the aim of preventing further violence (short-term), 
it is also correct to recognise that long-term prevention and reaction maintain 
a level of conceptual distinction and thus should not be blurred together.
In this light, long-term preventive measures addressing systemic and struc-
tural injustices (e.g. addressing poverty and under-development as a result of 
global policies) can be distinguished from reactive measures (e.g. sanctions or 
military intervention), because addressing issues of global injustice can/should 
occur well before there is any atrocity crime.56 The need for maintaining this 
distinction is seemingly echoed by Bellamy and Luck, when they mention 
52 Birte Møller, ‘R2P and the Vetoes in the Security Council (sc): The R2P and the Sovereignty 
Game in the Security Council (unsc): Syria versus Libya’ in Vasilka Sancin and Masa Kovič 
Dine (eds.), Responsibility to Protect in Theory and Practice (Ljubljana: GV Zalozba, 2013), 
pp. 175–99; Csaba Töro, ‘R2P without UN Security Council Mandate – Subsidiary Action as 
the Possible Way Out of Institutional Deadlock?’ in Vasilka Sancin and Masa Kovič Dine 
(eds.), Responsibility to Protect in Theory and Practice (Ljubljana: GV Zalozba, 2013), p. 239; 
Nicholas Tsagourias, ‘Whither the Veto: The Responsibility to Protect and the Security 
Council Veto’, in Vasilka Sancin and Masa Kovič Dine (eds.), Responsibility to Protect in 
Theory and Practice (Ljubljana: GV Zalozba, 2013), p. 157; Nina Zupan, ‘The Responsibility 
to Protect: The Soft Law Riddle and the Role of the United Nations’, in Vasilka Sancin and 
Masa Kovič Dine (eds.), Responsibility to Protect in Theory and Practice (Ljubljana: GV 
Zalozba, 2013), p. 541.
53 UN, Timely and Decisive Response, p. 11.
54 ibid., p. 7.
55 ibid., p. 9.
56 Brown and Bohm, ‘Jus Ante Bellum’.
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that ‘upstream or structural prevention can be differentiated from response 
because it is not triggered by particular actions or developments in the society 
in question’. As they continue, ‘its generic quality sets it apart’.57 Thus, con-
ceptually, there can be a clear line between long-term systemic and structural 
prevention and short-term prevention, even if there is a blurred line between 
short-term prevention and reaction. One result of blurring short-term preven-
tion with reaction is the risk of elevating short-term preventive measures over 
long-term commitments, since they represent potentially easy options for the 
international community.
Why long-term preventive thinking is not done more effectively in R2P 
debate might again be because mass atrocities are also usually perceived as 
unique acts, with different risk factors from those associated with conflict and 
violence more generally.58 Thus, long-term conflict and violence prevention 
strategies are seemingly not always seen as applicable to R2P situations, with 
targeted focus on the four crimes, leaving other long-term and conflict pre-
vention related measures under-theorised within R2P. Furthermore, some fear 
that expanding issues of prevention too far from the immediate threat of mass 
atrocity will undermine the utility and distinctiveness of R2P. For example, 
Michael Lund warns ‘with so much varied activity now being lumped under 
conflict prevention there is also a risk it will lose its distinctive meaning’.59 
This is echoed by the iciss, when it stated ‘taking such a broad approach may 
divert attention away from the behavioural origins of violent conflict that are 
ultimately political. Too heavy an emphasis on structural causes of conflict is 
also empirically inaccurate – social inequalities and resource scarcity do not 
in fact always lead to deadly conflict’.60 Nonetheless, even those who point out 
that the nexus between root causes and acts of atrocity crime is unclear do not 
suggest that we ignore economic risk factors.61
Where structural risk determinants are recognised, as done recently by 
Bellamy and Luck, the discussion quickly collapses into short-term preventative 
57 Bellamy and Luck, From Promise to Practice, p. 111.
58 ibid.
59 Michael Lund, ‘Operationalizing the Lessons from Recent Experience in Field-Level 
Conflict Prevention Strategies’, in Andreas Wimmer, Richard J. Goldstone, Donald L. 
Horowitz, Ulrike Joras, and Conrad Schetter (eds.), Facing Ethnic Conflicts: Towards a New 
Realism (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004), p. 12.
60 iciss, The Responsibility to Protect, p. 32.
61 See, for example, Stephen McLoughlin and Deborah Mayersen, ‘Risk and Resilience to 
Mass Atrocities in Africa: A Comparison of Rwanda and Botswana’, Journal of Genocide 
Research, 13(3): 247–269 (2011),.
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strategies applied to operational conditions that are already ripe within exist-
ing cycles of violence verging on one or more of the mass atrocity crimes.62 To 
be clear, we are not arguing that short-to-medium-term strategies are unnec-
essary or that having a sufficient focus on the triggers of political behaviour is 
problematic. This would be untenable, since it is likely that there will always 
be despots and genocidal fanatics to contend with despite coordinated best 
efforts. What we are suggesting, however, is that these shorter-term strategies 
remain necessary, but insufficient, unless they are meaningfully coupled to 
proactive long-term commitments to address key determinants associated 
with mass atrocity. We will continue this line of criticism with additional sug-
gestions for better operationalising long-term prevention later in the article.
2.2 The Assumption of Mass Atrocity Exceptionalism
R2P advocates justify its narrow focus on mass atrocities (and use this to 
assuage fears of the doctrine being so broad it can be used to justify any and all 
military interventions) by reference to the uniqueness of mass atrocity crimes, 
and this can be seen clearly in the work on risk factors, with R2P work develop-
ing tools to assess risks specific to the atrocity crimes/R2P crimes rather than 
conflict or violence risks more generally. This means that the links with conflict 
prevention research (or the prevention research associated with the individual 
four crimes) is not often well explored nor synthesised within R2P research, 
due to a stated perception that mass atrocity prevention is uniquely different 
from other forms of mass violence and conflict. This distinction when made 
in categorical terms is unfortunate, since, prima facie, R2P prevention work 
could learn a great deal from conflict and violence prevention research more 
generally. Bellamy makes this point in addressing the ‘common prevention 
agenda’ where he argues that the structural prevention of communal violence 
would decrease the likelihood of both armed conflict and peacetime atroci-
ties.63 Our point is that the global system feeds into structural prevention, and 
the international community’s role at the global level needs to be assessed and 
critiqued.
Despite claims of the uniqueness of atrocity crime risk factors, there is actu-
ally significant overlap between the risk factors associated with mass violence 
and conflict (and its preventative research) and the four mass atrocity crimes. 
In fact, comparing the list of usual risk factors between conflict prevention and 
mass atrocity prevention suggest more similarities in terms of risks than of 
uniqueness. The risk factors referred to in the Secretary-General’s Framework 
62 Bellamy and Luck, From Promise to Practice, Chapters 4, 5 and 6.
63 Bellamy, ‘Mass Atrocities and Armed Conflict’.
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of Analysis are similarly mostly very general, including armed conflict or insta-
bility, a record of past violations, motives, incentives and capacity, weak state 
structures, lack of resilience, and enabling circumstances and triggers.64 The 
risk factors specific to each different atrocity crime (rather than those com-
mon to all atrocities) in the Framework of Analysis (such as ‘signs of intent to 
destroy a group’ or ‘signs of widespread attacks’) are themselves short-term 
acts, and the point of this article is to challenge the short-term focus within 
R2P work and to address the relationship of the international community to 
long-term problems (and the behaviour changes required in international 
community actors to implement long-term prevention). The long-term risks 
do not seem so unique to atrocities.
The academic literature also provides multifarious underwriting risks 
associated with acts of mass atrocity, but their distinctiveness from general 
violence and conflict risk is not always clear-cut nor certain. For example, in 
addition to those mentioned in Section 1 above, Welsh and Dieng65 identify 
eight risk factors common to all atrocities, noting that mass atrocity crimes 
occur in similar settings and share features despite their differences. This sug-
gests a commonality between what are supposedly very different individual 
R2P crimes. As another example, Bellamy and Luck have recently identified 
a list of five ‘pre-existing’ risks associated with atrocity crime, including a his-
tory of communal violence, a history of election related violence, a weak and 
corrupt government, marked economic and social decline, and the presence 
of armed militia affiliated with opposed political groups. In all cases, argue 
Bellamy and Luck, these conditions were politicised in such a way that mass 
atrocity was ‘uniquely’ mobilised for the maintenance of power, for counter-in-
surgency, to promote radical social transformation, for rebellion, to terminate 
a protracted war, and/or in response to intercommunal strife.66 McLoughlin 
notes the ‘remarkable range of factors at play’ and the diversity of views over 
the nature and causes of genocide, which challenges attempts to pinpoint 
usefully distinct approaches to take when trying to prevent a specific atrocity 
crime.67
64 UN, Fulfilling Our Collective Responsibility: International Assistance. See also UN, Framework 
of Analysis.
65 J. Welsh and A. Dieng, ‘Assessing the Risks of Atrocity Crimes’, Genocide Studies and 
Prevention: An International Journal, 9(3): 4–12 (2016).
66 Bellamy and Luck, From Promise to Practice, pp. 165 and 116.
67 Stephen McLoughlin, The Structural Prevention of Mass Atrocities: Understanding Risk 
and Resilience (London: Routledge, 2015), p. 30. For example, individual imagination, 
exclusionary practices, removal of actors who pose a threat to incumbents’ power, 
aftermath of conflict/state failure, and poverty and inequality in divided societies.
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Nevertheless, these risk factors can be viewed as determinants for mass vio-
lence and conflict more generally, and not just as unique risk factors for atroci-
ties. This is because although there is something unique about mass atrocity in 
terms of its ultimate mobilisation in scale and scope, many of the risk factors 
that precede mass atrocity are the same risk factors for general non-ideological 
violence and conflict. A history of instability or a record of international legal 
violations can lead to violence that does not meet the threshold for the legal 
definitions of a mass atrocity crime. But this violence is just as deserving of 
preventive efforts, whether or not it meets certain legal definitions. Indeed, 
as Schabas notes, prevention of crimes against humanity ‘involves addressing 
violations of human rights that may not yet warrant qualification as “gross and 
systematic”’.68 This suggests that there is heuristic value in making stronger 
and more systematic interconnected links between conflict risk research and 
research involved in the four mass atrocity crimes.
For example, akin to more general conflict situations, Straus has referred 
to mass atrocities as a strategic response by elites to events, rather than being 
deeply rooted in inevitable ideological, identity differences.69 Similarly, Simon 
draws attention to the motivation of actors to commit atrocities, not just their 
ability (power) to carry out attacks, and these motivations are not always purely 
ideological.70 Harrison points to five key factors present in African atrocities 
since the 1990s, including the strategic nature of the violence, enabling access 
to resources, and contested trade routes and labour.71 The literature on the 
international community’s role in contributing to violence and conflict can be 
enlightening when considering the international community’s contribution to 
mass atrocities. If atrocities can be a strategic choice for actors, out of a range 
of options, rather than inevitable ideological conflicts, then decreasing the 
need to control limited resources/trade/labour is an important way to address 
root cause poverty and inequality within a state, and in how the global system 
operates.
Because there is complex interaction between the underlying root cause 
factors (such as deprivation and social exclusion or poor trade relations and 
68 William A. Schabbas, ‘Prevention of Crimes against Humanity’, Journal of International 
Criminal Justice, 16(4): 705–728 (2018), at p. 705.
69 Straus, ‘Triggers of Mass Atrocities’. See also Straus, ‘Theories of Genocide’, Terrorism and 
Prevention of Violence, 24: 544–60 (2012). Here Straus notes the very strong connection 
between genocide and war.
70 David J. Simon, ‘Building State Capacity to Prevent Atrocity Crimes: Implementing 
Pillars One and Two of the R2P Framework’, Stanley Foundation Policy Analysis Brief, 2 
September 2012, pp. 2, 4.
71 Harrison, ‘Onwards and Sidewards?’.
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external economic conditionalities) and short-term ‘proximate drivers’ (such 
as global price shocks, violent competition for resources), it is hard to demon-
strate a clear and direct link between root cause risk factors and specific mass 
atrocity crimes.72 McLoughlin points this out when he argues that work on 
international community assistance often ignores important local resilience 
sites and situations when, despite the presence of risk factors, there are no 
mass atrocity crimes.73 Nevertheless, it should be noted that this does not 
mean it is right to dismiss root determinants that are related to violence more 
generally, rather than focus on the proximate drivers of atrocities specifically. 
McLoughlin’s critique of the indirect link between root causes and atrocity 
crimes is aimed at third party intervention and generalised approaches, rather 
than denying the importance of addressing root causes such as under-develop-
ment.74 Moreover, although political motivations for atrocity crimes are crucial 
for understanding and preventing mass atrocity (as noted in the iciss report 
above), those political motivations are not hatched in socio-economic vacu-
ums and significantly draw upon and utilise systemic conditions in such a way 
to mobilise mass atrocity. As a result, logically, diminishing the acuteness of 
systemic and related structural risk factors will also diminish the existing ‘fuel 
cells’ available to politically mobilise mass violence, including the four crimes 
associated with mass atrocity. If international community actors’ behaviour 
is weakening local resilience, then a broader view of international commu-
nity assistance preventive duties can only help atrocity prevention. Lastly, the 
very fact that 43 per cent of all conflicts resume within five years of their end-
ing suggests that broader long-term systemic conditions matter for delivering 
peaceful outcomes. Although it may not be clear exactly how systemic and 
related structural conditions matter, it is nonetheless reasonable to assume 
that a focus on short-term solutions will remain insufficient as a general policy 
for diminishing risk factors that lead to violence and mass atrocity.75
2.3 Local Problem, Global Solution
In addition to a focus on short-term solutions, even when long-term problems 
are identified, what is particularly problematic in the R2P literature is that, hav-
ing located the source of trouble (for example, in the 2013 State Responsibility 
72 Raymond Gilpin, ‘Economic Drivers of Mass Atrocities: Implications for Policy and 
Prevention’, Stanley Foundation Policy Analysis Brief, August 2015, p. 2.
73 McLoughlin, Structural Prevention.
74 ibid., p. 30.
75 Daniel Philpott, Just and Unjust Peace: An Ethic of Political Reconciliation (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), p. 1.
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report and 2015 Implementation report) to be poor state structures that are not 
resilient, the 2014 International Community Assistance report naturally looks 
at ‘positive’ assistance by the international community towards improving 
these structures (e.g. by dissemination of standards of international human 
rights and humanitarian law).76 In the 2013 State Responsibility report, the link 
between socio-economic justice and violence is noted, and a possible solution 
for a domestic welfare safety net to reduce socio-economic disparities in trou-
bled states is mooted. In the 2014 International Community Assistance report, 
socio-economic justice and development are again stated to be important, 
but there is no consideration of the possible global solutions available – no 
equivalent of the 2013 report’s welfare safety net.77 The benevolence (or benign 
nature) of the international community is again assumed in how the inter-
national community can help change state problems and domestic injustice, 
rather than also looking at global injustice and the international community’s 
role in perpetuating unjust systemic conditions and the effect of these global 
conditions in problem states.78
3 Global Problems Causing Local Problems
As stated before, the 2013 State Responsibility report looks briefly at risks 
within the problem state that enable mass atrocity crimes. Yet the 2014 
International Community Assistance report does not address fully the ways in 
which the international community can make these local problems worse. In 
other words, the report does not say what the international community needs 
to stop doing before it can actually start assisting vulnerable states and peo-
ple. For example, if the imf loan conditionality prevents states from enacting 
social security measures,79 then the international community can be reason-
ably understood to be contributing directly to determinant factors associated 
with mass atrocities by preventing the suggested welfare safety net (while at 
the same time, perhaps hypocritically, offering human rights training as a form 
of positive assistance). Further, if overseas development assistance (oda) 
76 UN, Fulfilling Our Collective Responsibility: International Assistance, p. 8.
77 ibid., pp. 5 and 8.
78 Dunford and Neu, ‘Already Existing Intervention’.
79 William R. Easterly, The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have 
Done So Much Ill and So Little Good (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 117; 
William R. Easterly, ‘How the Millennium Development Goals Are Unfair to Africa’, World 
Development, 37(1): 26–35 (2009).
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programs worsen local inequality and distribution of resources, heightening 
tensions between communities,80 then the international community’s devel-
opment programs could be exacerbating the underlying socio-economic risk 
factors associated with mass violence, rather than being a positive actor in 
prevention. For example, increasing research suggests a correlation between 
poor health systems and conflict, noting the relationship between poor health 
systems, poor population health, a lack of ‘smart’ development policy by the 
international community,81 and increased risk of violence,82 which has exac-
erbated the risk of mass atrocity, particularly ethnic cleansing and genocide.83
In order to give more detail beyond these small examples, and to challenge 
the idea of an inherently benevolent international community seeking to help 
problem states, we argue that there are a number of links between socio-eco-
nomic injustice and civil and political strife (whether mass atrocity crimes 
or not); between global international community-dominated systems and 
national structural problems – specifically between international community 
behaviours and intra-state violence, including atrocities.
The importance of socio-economic justice in resilience to atrocities comes 
from the fact that socio-economic rights support the meaningful exercise of 
civil and political rights, not least in fragile states where local resistance to 
oppressive policies might be weak.84 The relationship of root causes to conflict 
is noted in Article 55 of the UN Charter,85 which provides:
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being 
which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations 
based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination 
of peoples, the United Nations shall promote:
80 Easterly, ‘Millennium Development Goals’; Dambisa Moyo, Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not 
Working and How There Is Another Way for Africa (London: Penguin books, 2009).
81 Sebastian Kevany, ‘Global Health Diplomacy: A Deus ex Machina for International 
Development and Relations’, International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 
3(2): 111–112 (2014), p. 111; Sebastian Kevany and Michael Baker, ‘Applying Smart Power via 
Global Health Engagement’, Joint Forces Quarterly, 83(4): 413–417 (2016).
82 Joao Nunes, ‘Disease Diplomacy: International Norms and Global Health Security’, Ethics 
and International Affairs, 31(3): 385–388 (2017).
83 Sebastian Kevany, Amanda Hatfield, Nibretie G. Workneh, Bilal A. Z. Durrani, Yonas Bekele, 
Usma Khan, Karen White, and Roger Myrick, ‘Diplomatic and Operational Adaptations 
to Global Health Programmes in Post-Conflict Settings: Contributions of Monitoring and 
Evaluation Systems to Health Sector Development and Nation Building in South Sudan’, 
Medicine, Conflict and Survival, 28(3): 247–262 (2012).
84 Thomas Pogge, ‘Priorities of Global Justice’, Metaphilosophy, 32: 8–20 (2001).
85 Article 55, UN Charter (1945).
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a) higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic 
and social progress and development;
b) solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; 
and international cultural and educational cooperation …
Thus, it makes sense to enable socio-economic development and support of 
those unable to exercise meaningful civil and political participation – more so 
than, for example, offering training to target states in human rights and good 
governance, or telling a state to sign the 1998 Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (icc statute).86
3.1 Economic Drivers Undermining State Resilience
Beyond the general theoretical and empirical link between socio-economic 
inequality and violence,87 quantitative analysis of conflicts over many years 
makes the same point in relation to real conflicts.88 Poverty is a significant fac-
tor contributing to civil war,89 whereas economic development reduces the 
risk of civil war.90 This shows a general link between socio-economic condi-
tions and decreased violence, including cases where a mass atrocity crime has 
occurred. We have already made the point that mass atrocities often occur dur-
ing conflict or violence more generally, and many risk factors for the four atroc-
ity crimes are similar to risk factors for conflict. In relation to mass atrocity, 
86 See, for example, iciss, The Responsibility to Protect, pp. 15–17, 19.
87 Karim Bahgat, Kendra Dupuy, Scott Gates, Håvard Mokleiv Nygård, Siri Aas Rustad, Håvard 
Strand, Henrik Urdal, Gudrun Østby, Gray Barrett, and Solveig Hillesund, ‘Inequality 
and Armed Conflict: Evidence and Data’, Background Report for the UN and World Bank 
Flagship Study on Development and Conflict Prevention, Peace and Research Institute Oslo, 
April 2017, https://www.prio.org/Publications/Publication/?x=10538, accessed 15 April 
2020.
88 Nicolas Sambanis, ‘Using Case Studies to Refine and Expand the Theory of Civil War’ in 
Paul Collier and Nicolas Sambanis (eds.), Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis. 
Vol. 2, Europe, Central Asia, and Other Regions (Washington DC: The World Bank, 2015); 
Frances Stewart, ‘The Root Causes of Humanitarian Emergencies’ in Wayne Nafziger, 
Frances Stewart, and Raimo Väyrynen (eds.), War Hunger and Displacement: The Origins 
of Humanitarian Emergencies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Charles Boix, 
‘Economic Roots of Civil Wars and Revolutions in the Contemporary World’, World Politics, 
60(2): 390–437 (2008).
89 Lars-Erik Cederman, Kristian Gleditsch, and Halvard Buhaig, Inequality, Grievances and 
Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
90 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, ‘Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War’, American 
Political Science Review, 97(1): 75–90 (2003); Volker Krause and Suzuki Susumu, ‘Trade 
Openness, Economic Development and Civil War Onset in the Post-Colonial World, 1950–
1992’, Conflict, Security and Development, 5(1): 23–43 (2005); Ajay Mehta, The Economics of 
Killing: How the West Fuels War and Poverty in the Developing World (London: Pluto Press, 
2012).
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economic inequality (particularly horizontal inequality between groups) is 
widely accepted to increase the risk of atrocity crimes.91 In R2P terms, the inter-
national community could enable local resilience by supporting socio-eco-
nomic rights through positive behaviour with target states,92 not just through 
training target states in civil and political rights and good governance.
In relation to the international community’s role in promoting socio-eco-
nomic injustice and violence, rather than helping support human rights in 
problem states, the global finance regime has been linked to local human 
rights problems, and it has been argued that the effects of the global finan-
cial crisis showed that we should not assume that free markets are the best 
way to maximise human welfare.93 The 2008 global financial crisis (and, more 
generally, any instability in financial markets) resulted in a loss of livelihoods, 
having a detrimental effect on human rights such as access to food, housing, 
education, healthcare, and non-discrimination.94 In R2P terms, deteriorating 
state finances means states are not able to fulfil their primary responsibility 
to protect their citizens’ socio-economic rights (again, a good example would 
be the inability of a state to maintain welfare safety nets that are associated 
with a decreased risk of atrocities). Mary Dowell-Jones and David Kinley make 
the link between financial insecurity, rising unemployment, reduced welfare 
spending and increased social unrest (though not specifically atrocities).95 The 
structure of the global financial system might seem too remote from any par-
ticular state, or particular part of the international community institutions, to 
blame for atrocity violence. Yet scholars like Vijay Mehta charge Western states 
with actively fuelling unemployment and unrest (despite preaching good gov-
ernance), allowing businesses to support the local politicians who enable them 
to do business and who siphon public money away from national investment 
in good governance structures and social welfare.96 As just one example, Shell 
(British and Dutch owned) continues to enjoy drilling rights in Nigeria that 
were established during colonial rule,97 from which numerous human rights 
91 Frances Stewart, Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: Understanding Group Violence in 
Multiethnic Societies (London: Palgrave, 2008).
92 Dunford and Neu, ‘Already Existing Intervention’.
93 Mary Dowell-Jones and David Kinley, ‘Minding the Gap: Global Finance and Human 
Rights’, Ethics and International Affairs, 25(2): 183–210 (2011), pp. 183–84.
94 ibid., p. 186.
95 ibid., p. 191.
96 Mehta, The Economics of Killing, p. 90; Dunford and Neu, ‘Already Existing Intervention’.
97 Jedrzej G. Frynas, Oil in Nigeria: Conflict and Litigation Between Oil Companies and Village 
Communities (Hamburg: Lit Verlag, 2000).
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violations continue to be documented including links to militias engaged in 
mass violence (and potential acts of ethnic cleansing).98
Beyond the general global financial system, there is a strong correlation 
between imf involvement in a state and state collapse. Although it is not easy 
to show causation (and these states were hardly healthy before imf interven-
tion) the link is still troubling. In addition to colonial exploitation, incompe-
tence, and ‘chaotic decolonisation’, Liberia, Somalia, Zaire, and Sierra Leone 
all spent over 50 years in imf structural adjustment programs (a key policy of 
which is for the government to cut subsidies necessary for basic subsistence) 
before eventual state collapse in the 1990s.99 Ghana’s colonial legacies include 
economic marginalisation and violence towards locals from settler farm-
ers.100 In 1990–1991 the imf recommended ‘structural adjustment’ policies for 
Rwanda including removing economic protections afforded to local producers – 
something that led to increased poverty and inequality after Rwanda’s expo-
sure to the market, resulting in rapid increases in poverty, horizontal inequality 
between groups, and social unrest.101 Prior to this, Belgium’s colonial differen-
tial treatment of Tutsi and Hutu populations (and the stoking of violence and 
conflict in neighbouring states such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
from colonial times onwards) has been linked to rising ethnic tensions that 
culminated in the 1990s.102 These tensions were not helped by the develop-
ment enterprise, which continued the colonial policy of hiring elites – gen-
erally Tutsi – if any locals at all were hired, and failing to involve the national 
population in the development process.103 Ban is correct that the atrocities 
in Rwanda did not start in the massacres themselves, but his assertion that 
the atrocities started with hate speech and discrimination still hides a deeper 
history and role of the international community in building up conditions that 
helped enable the atrocities. It is troubling that R2P reports, including iciss, 
view the World Bank and imf exclusively as a source for solutions to atrocity 
98 Kenneth Omeje, High Stakes and Stakeholders: Oil Conflict and Security in Nigeria (London: 
Routledge, 2017).
99 Easterly, ‘Millennium Development Goals’, pp. 191 and 239.
100 Emmanuel W. Kotia and Festus K. Aubyn, ‘Building National Infrastructures for Peace 
in Africa: Understanding the Role of the National Peace Council in Ghana’, Kennesaw 
State University Paper, 2013. Available at: http://works.bepress.com/emmanuel_kotia/10/, 
accessed 15 April 2020.
101 Richard H. Robbins, Global Problems and the Culture of Capitalism (Boston MA: Allyn 
and Bacon, 2002); Peter Verwimp, ‘The Political Economy of Coffee, Dictatorship, and 
Genocide’, European Journal of Political Economy, 19(2): 161–181 (2003), p. 161.
102 Bruce Jones, ‘Intervention without Borders: Humanitarian Intervention in Rwanda, 1990–
94’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 24(2): 225–249 (1995), p. 225.
103 Uvin, Aiding Violence, pp. 107, 136 and 143.
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risks, by rewarding ‘good’ states with extra funding and withholding funds 
from problem states.104 Yet this same behaviour has shown to also weaken and 
threaten state resilience, particularly in states where underlying tensions exist 
and help is needed most.105
Developing this correlation between ‘international community’ involve-
ment and violence within a state, Anne Orford and Susan Woodward both 
point out the effects of the World Bank and imf structural adjustment pro-
grams in the former Yugoslavia before the mass atrocities in the early 1990s, 
with economic decline leading to social unrest, calls for autonomy, and 
increasing instability.106 This suggests that international community assis-
tance should begin with fundamental redrawing of the relationship between 
the international community and troubled states, rather than merely offering 
human rights training, diplomatic missions, or the exertion of pressure.
3.2 Overseas Development Assistance and Resilience Building
While R2P literature references to oda can be praised for recognising its 
potential long-term relationship to mass violence, we argue that it is wrong to 
view the international community role as a benign distributor of aid that helps 
prevent violence. There is a vast field of development literature critiquing 
oda and financing for development more generally. Development literature 
demonstrates either that the amount of aid given by the rich to the poor is 
largely falling107 or that the entire enterprise of aid is corrupt, self-sustaining, 
fails to achieve its aims, and potentially contributes to violence around the 
world, and is therefore in need of significant reform.108 For example, despite 
104 See Section 1 of this article.
105 Bellamy and Luck, From Promise to Practice, p. 124.
106 Alexandra Bohm, ‘Security and International Law: The Responsibility to Protect’ in Mary 
Footer, Julia Schmidt, Lydia Davis-Bright, and Nigel White (eds.), Security and International 
law (London: Hart, 2016), pp. 115–136; John Western and Joshua Goldstein, ‘Humanitarian 
Intervention Comes of Age: Lessons from Somalia to Libya’, Foreign Affairs 90(6): 50–51 
(2011); Anne Orford, ‘Locating the International: Military and Monetary Interventions 
after the Cold War’, Harvard International Law Journal, 38(2): 443–486 (1997); Anne Orford, 
Reading Humanitarian Intervention: Human Rights and the Use of Force in International 
Law (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Susan Woodward, The Balkan 
Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington DC: Brookings, 1995).
107 Thomas Dichter, Despite Good Intentions: Why Development Assistance to the Third World 
Has Failed (Boston MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003); Ajay Mehta points out 
that of the limited amount of oda given by rich countries, much of this goes to states such 
as India which has its own nuclear programme and could therefore spend more wisely on 
its own citizens rather than needing aid.
108 Moyo, Dead Aid.
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the billions spent on aid since the 1960s, there has been very little overall reduc-
tion in global poverty (especially if you remove the progress of China), and 
many unpredicted negative effects of the development industry.109 Similarly, 
aid projects rarely meet their targets and the conditionality attached to many 
projects means that much aid is wasted – such as the requirement that recipi-
ent states use aid to buy products from the donor state even though this is far 
more expensive than buying the products elsewhere.110 This tied aid ‘is a par-
ticularly inefficient form of development assistance because it does not help 
poor countries develop their economies. Instead of creating new businesses 
and jobs in recipient countries, most of the benefits remain in the donor 
nations’.111 Some estimates have suggested that as much as 80 per cent of the 
costs of UN development projects goes to staff and UN expenses and not the 
recipient state.112 These authors all give examples of unhelpful aid projects, 
such as building roads, but failing to ensure their maintenance; or giving pat-
ented seeds that cannot be used the following year without payment.113
This literature is not mere speculation, listing many examples of inappropri-
ate oda which does not help those most in need. This is troubling in itself, but 
also because iciss and the Secretary-General have mentioned oda as a solu-
tion to the inequality associated with conflicts and mass atrocities. However, 
this raises the question about whether oda can be tied more specifically to 
mass atrocities via its role in perpetuating poverty and horizontal inequality, 
which then underwrites conditions that increase the risks of any of the four 
atrocity crimes.114 The previous section gave the example of Rwanda, where 
109 Dichter, Despite Good Intentions. Since the 1960s the ‘development industry’ has spent 
US$1.7 trillion but has had few positive results and may overall have had negative results.
110 Pekka Hirvonen, ‘Stingy Samaritans: Why Recent Increases in Development Aid Fail to 
Help the Poor’, Global Policy Forum Paper, August 2005, https://www.globalpolicy.org/
home/240-international-aid/45056-stingy-samaritans.html, accessed 15 April 2020.
111 ibid., p. 5. The South Africa-based ngo ActionAid estimates that $5 billion in aid goes 
wasted each year because tied aid inflates procurement costs. Furthermore, tying can slow 
aid down, as a lot of time goes wasted in complicated procurement procedures even in 
severe emergency situations. Real Aid: Ending Aid Dependency, ActionAid International, 
2005.https://www.actionaid.org.uk/sites/default/files/doc_lib/real_aid_3.pdf, accessed 
October 2020.
112 Graham Hancock, Lords of Poverty: The Power, Prestige, and Corruption of the International 
Aid Business (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1989), p. 9.
113 Easterly, ‘Millennium Development Goals’; Dichter, Despite Good Intentions.
114 Stanley Foundation, ‘Preventing Mass Atrocities: Resilient Societies, State Capacity and 
Structural Reform’, Policy Memo, 30 October 2013, p. 3, https://www.stanleyfoundation.
org/publications/policy_memo/PreventingMassAtrocities-ResilientSocietiesStateCapacit
yStructuralReform.pdf, accessed 15 April 2020.
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the development programs contributed directly to increased social unrest and 
tensions between Hutus and Tutsis.115
Even if oda was put to good use, the money received in aid is dwarfed by 
protectionism in markets, something the iciss mentions as a root cause, but 
which has received little attention in R2P literature (although development 
scholars have suggested that poor countries ignore demands to open their 
markets fully to multinational corporations).116 For example, it is estimated 
that the impact of agricultural subsidies (US$250 billion a year) by developed 
countries on African states significantly undermines market access and com-
petitiveness for what is often the main industry in African economies. One 
result of these subsidies for US and EU farmers is reduced market access, 
reduced incomes, and lower gdp productivity for African agricultural states, 
which in turn undermines and reduces available tax bases for social projects 
(not to mention population well-being). This is problematic, since if there is a 
connection between economic prosperity, economic hardship, inequality, and 
conflict, as we are suggesting, then these market restrictions will have long-
term effects on developing states and their resilience, which increase the like-
lihood of violence, and, over time, increases the risk of mass atrocity (e.g. as 
documented in Nigeria).117
3.3 Rethinking the Socio-economic Link to Mass Atrocity
Although development aid is increasingly understood as problematic, the 
global financial system and other socio-economic factors also have effect on 
human rights and structures of resilience. Dowell-Jones and Kinley recom-
mend a more regulated global financial system to give states the ability to 
protect themselves from the worst externalities of the global market rather 
than demanding a liberalised financial system as well as liberalised markets.118 
Again, related to markets and finance, but a slightly separate point, is the 
115 Uvin, Aiding Violence, pp. 107, 136 and 143; Pierre Perrin, ‘The Impact of Humanitarian 
Aid on Conflict Development’, International Review of the Red Cross, No. 323, 6 June 1998; 
Mary B. Anderson, Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – Or War (Boulder CO: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1999); Robbins, Global Problems.
116 Mehta, The Economics of Killing, p. 146; Moyo, Dead Aid.
117 Ukoha Ukiwo, ‘Horizontal Inequalities and Ethnic Violence: Evidence from Calabar and 
Warri, Nigeria’ in Frances Stewart (ed.), Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict: Understanding 
Group Violence in Multiethnic Societies (London: Palgrave, 2008).
118 Dowell-Jones and Kinley, ‘Minding the Gap’; Mary Dowell-Jones, ‘Financial Institutions 
and Human Rights’, Human Rights Law Review, 13(3): 423–468 (2013); David Held, 
‘Cosmopolitanism: Globalization Tamed?’ Review of International Studies, 29(4): 465–480 
(2003).
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activities of transnational corporations and other private actors. The ability 
of the private sector to increase inclusivity has been mentioned within R2P 
reports as well as recently championed by Bellamy and Luck.119 However, 
the private sector, as much as the development industry, can be a significant 
source of human rights abuse, such as the controversial use of private military 
and security contractors, or the extractive industries, both of which often leave 
victims struggling to gain redress.120
Furthermore, a link has been made between resource control and mass 
atrocity, such as Sierra Leone’s diamond mines and other extractive indus-
tries in eastern drc.121 What is less often mentioned is who is buying these 
resources – the role of Western companies, governments, and consumers in 
fuelling the trade in these minerals. If market demand helps to drive vio-
lence,122 which we believe plays a key role, then responsible action by demand 
side actors needs to be linked to R2P preventative obligations under Pillar 
ii. If not, then R2P will remain symptom based versus tackling root causes, 
diminishing the effectiveness and sincerity of mass atrocity commitments.
In response we suggest that there is a correlative, if not fully determinant, 
link between the international community’s economic interventions into trou-
bled states and the risks of violence which spring from the resulting socio-eco-
nomic deprivations. As a result, this suggests a research agenda that requires 
far more attention than it has previously received, and the aim here is to high-
light this gap. Moreover, as has been recently argued, the international com-
munity is already making significant ‘interventions’ within fragile states and 
these actions have significant moral implications for the legitimacy of preven-
tion and intervention narratives within R2P.123 This link does not mean that 
those carrying out acts of violence should not bear any responsibility for their 
119 Bellamy and Luck, From Promise to Practice.
120 Michael J. Kelly, Prosecuting Corporations for Genocide (Oxford: OUP, 2016);Vasil Popovski, 
Marija Topuzovska and Mirjana Borota Popovska, M. ‘Corporate social responsibility–
new reality of corporate identity of European companies’ in Proceedings from the 
International scientific conference (2012) No. 1, pp. 79–95), https://www.researchgate.net/
publication/274687193, accessed October, 2020; Sif Thorgeirsson, ‘Closing the Courtroom 
Door: Where Can Victims of Human Rights Abuse by Business Find Justice?’, Business & 
Human Rights Resource Center, 1 December 2014, https://www.business-humanrights.org/
en/closing-the-courtroom-door-where-can-victims-of-human-rights-abuse-by-business-
find-justice, accessed 6 April 2019.
121 Simon, ‘Building State Capacity’.
122 Jennifer Hazen, What Rebels Want: Resources and Supply Networks in Wartime (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2013).
123 Dunford and Neu, ‘Already Existing Intervention’.
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actions. Nor does it mean that those acts of violence will automatically esca-
late into any of the four mass atrocity crimes. As with most things, causes of 
violence are often complex and multifarious. What we argue is that the rela-
tionship between powerful agents in the international community and mass 
atrocity remains under-developed within R2P debates and that this merits fur-
ther investigation. Moreover, even if this relationship is only at the moment 
correlatively true, then the assumptions made by scholars and R2P advocates 
like Bellamy and Luck pertaining to the ‘limited’ role the international com-
munity plays in atrocity prevention is suspect and requires better investigation 
of long-term systemic and related structural root causes. This is particularly 
required if the international community really is committed to assisting states 
at risk of atrocity violence.
As a means to start this reinvestigation, we have suggested that socio-eco-
nomic injustice plays a key role in violence, and that the international 
community has a role in perpetuating injustice and violence through its 
design and preservation of global systems that produce injustice. iciss’s 
root causes – of poverty, unequal resource distribution, poor market access 
and terms of trade – have not been helped or even addressed by the inter-
national community. Thus, instead of solely focusing on capacity building 
and education in human rights/international humanitarian law standards, 
the international community would do well to also address its behaviours 
that maintain corruption and poor governance, or that remove welfare 
safety nets or market access in vulnerable countries.
4 Long-term Root Cause Prevention Strategies
4.1 Address Global Development and Horizontal Inequality
iciss mentions Cold War debts, poor terms of trade, and unequal access to 
markets as root causes of violence. Given these root causes, the root cause pre-
vention envisaged by iciss includes development assistance, promotion of 
economic growth, and encouragement of economic reform.124 Ban’s Secretary-
General’s reports to the General Assembly are somewhat more vague in their 
suggestions, referring to oda and the need for this assistance to be given in 
ways that do not worsen tensions of inequalities. Nevertheless, the Secretary-
General has been understandably hesitant to set out in detail what sort of com-
mitments would be expected of the international community to meet these 
124 iciss, The Responsibility to Protect, pp. 21 and 23.
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conditions. Within academia a large amount of work has been undertaken on 
duties of global redistributive justice from the global North to the global South, 
as stand-alone duties unrelated to violent conflict or atrocities. Global justice 
arguments include that we have duties to help the world’s poorest because to 
permit gross misery and suffering just by reason of the coincidence of some-
one’s birthplace is unfair; and that we have ‘thick cosmopolitan’ duties because 
we participate in a global regime that is unjust to the world’s poorest and 
therefore have duties to make reparations.125 These arguments are not specifi-
cally about prevention of violence, but go to strengthen the argument that the 
international community should be undertaking redistributive justice efforts 
as part of its responsibility to prevent. This is particularly the case if it should 
be doing so anyway as a matter of fairness and if under-development is linked 
to inequality and violence. Given the problems with oda, it is plausible that 
the international community is failing in its responsibility to prevent through 
mutually consistent development, which needs to be addressed. It could 
address this by not giving development assistance at all,126 or, by doing so in a 
way that empowers local resilience rather than contributing to weak structures 
at the state level. What is also necessary, if prevention via socio-economic resil-
ience is desirable, is to create mutually consistent trade relations that allow 
for real market access and competition on an even playing field, without the 
sorts of subsidy blockages often inflicted on LMICs by the United States and 
European Union. For example, there is significant literature highlighting the 
adverse effects of agricultural subsidies and intellectual property restrictions 
on agriculturally dependent economies in Africa, in which uneven trade barri-
ers ‘lock out’ African countries from participating in the global market as well 
as undercutting African markets with subsidised products from Western states. 
R2P envisages that international financial institutions can help with preven-
tion through encouraging good governance,127 but we argue that many global 
institutions actually contribute to gross inequality (and indirectly, the result-
ing violence). If we agree that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure, 
125 Simon Caney, ‘Global Distributive Justice and the State’, Political Studies, 56 (3): 487–518 
(2008); Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1979); Onora O’Neill, Bounds of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000); Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan 
Responsibilities and Reforms (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2005).
126 See, for example, Olivia Rutazibwa, ‘What if We Took Autonomous Recovery Seriously? A 
Democratic Critique of Contemporary Western Ethical Foreign Policy’, Ethical Perspectives, 
20(1): 81–108 (2013).
127 Bellamy and Luck, From Promise to Practice.
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then, as well as overhauling the way we do aid, we will also need to overhaul 
the way we govern global finance and trade.
4.2 Raise Funds to Pay for Prevention
In the wake of recent revelations about how little tax some global corpora-
tions pay,128 there have been demands for a fair global tax system that would 
increase global revenues and ensure that more funds were available for all the 
various costly measures suggested in the prevention literature.129 However, 
the role of Western governments in allowing Western corporations to avoid 
taxes is only one side of a double-edged sword, since many of these same 
Western governments also encourage ‘capital flight’ from lower income coun-
tries via investment loopholes that allow wealthy individuals from developing 
countries to ‘offshore’ money away from local tax systems. As one example, 
it is often reported that half of Zambia’s gdp is lost to capital flight, much of 
which is funnelled into offshore tax havens.130 These ‘shadow investments’ not 
only protect revenue from taxation in developing countries, but also, in many 
cases, allow ill-begotten revenues to avoid any form of public accountability. 
To be clear, this is not merely a consequence of local corruption, from which 
to assign responsibility. For example, the London property market has tradi-
tionally been seen as a convenient and easy place to hide wealth away from tax 
collection due to the UK’s lax actions on prohibiting capital flight. The result of 
capital flight and its adverse effect on state resilience is well documented in the 
development studies literature. And the logic of this negative relationship is 
simple, smaller tax base due to capital flight, lower resources for a state to offer 
economic equity measures, welfare safety nets, self-development programmes 
and, ultimately, its ability for population protection under its Pillar i obliga-
tions. Yet, recognition of the potential relationship of capital flight on conflict 
risk is near absent within the R2P prevention literature (although present in 
128 Chloe Farand, ‘Six British Multinationals “Did Not Pay any UK Corporation Tax in 
2014”’, The Independent, 31 January 2016, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/six-
british-multinationals-including-shell-vodafone-lloyds-banking-group-did-not-paid-
any-a6844676.html, accessed 15 April 2020.
129 Thomas Pogge and Krishen Mehta, Global Tax Fairness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2016); John Christensen, ‘Academics Stand against Poverty Report on Illicit Financial 
Flows’, Tax Justice Network, 6 September 2014, https://www.taxjustice.net/2014/09/06/
academics-stand-poverty-report-illicit-financial-flows/, accessed 15 April 2020.
130 Ed Stoddard, ‘Zambia Loses Almost $9 bln in Capital Flight in Past Decade –U.S. 
Watchdog’, Reuters, 17 December 2012 https://www.reuters.com/article/zambia-capital-
flight/zambia-loses-almost-9-bln-in-capital-flight-in-past-decade-u-s-watchdog-
idUSL5E8NE25E20121217, accessed 15 April 2020.
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the conflict prevention literature). As a result, questions about Western partic-
ipation in allowing capital flight and its risk potential remains underexamined 
and ignored in favour of traditional narratives that understand the risks for 
atrocity crimes as resting squarely on problem states.
4.3 Control the Arms Trade
A commitment to reducing and controlling global arms sales would be a key 
long-term prevention measure (rather than temporary arms embargos as a 
short-term measure). The quantity of arms circulating in vulnerable states is 
particularly worrying given the role of several wealthy states within the inter-
national community in the arms trade. For example, between 1994 and 2004 
the arms trade generated US$269 billon with US$185 billion worth of arms ear-
marked for developing countries.131 In 2013 alone, the global arms trade was 
estimated to be above US$85 billion.132 Nevertheless, as argued by Perkins 
and Neumayer,133 despite some regulatory compliance, there is little evidence 
that Western countries have systematically discriminated against arm sales 
to states with poor human rights records and democratic freedoms as well as 
from buyers in areas where acute human security risks are present. This condi-
tion is exacerbated by arms deals associated with a lack of documentation on 
the recipients and increasing complaints of corruption in the arms industry.134 
The Arms Trade Treaty attempts to limit the sale of arms if they may be used 
to commit atrocities; with around 60 ratifications at present. Yet it is widely 
accepted that the treaty is far from achieving its aims, and it has been heav-
ily criticised. In particular, the treaty does not include ammunition within its 
scope and excludes defence cooperation agreements, leaving wide scope in 
exporter assessment of the risk of export and increasing exporter responsibility 
131 Maria D. C. Garcia-Alonso and Paul Levine, ‘Arms Trade and Arm Races: A Strategic 
Analysis’ in Todd Sandler and Keith Hartly (eds.), Handbook of Defense Economics. Vol. 2, 
Defense in a Globalized World (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2007), pp. 941–71.
132 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (sipri), ‘International Arms Control 
and Arms Transfers’, SIPRI Yearbook 2015, http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2015/10, accessed 
15 April 2020.
133 Richard Perkins and Eric Neumayer, ‘The Organized Hypocrisy of Ethical Foreign Policy: 
Human Rights, Democracy and Western Arms Sales’, Geoforum 41(2): 247–256 (2010).
134 Isebill V. Gruhn, ‘Human Rights Abuses in Africa: Local Problems, Global Obligations’, 
Human Rights Review 1(1): 65–77 (1999); Neil Cooper, ‘What’s the Point of Arms Transfer 
Controls?’ Contemporary Security Policy, 27(1): 118–137 (2006); Mehta, Economics of Killing, 
pp. 35–37.
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for aiding or assisting international crimes.135 As one example, despite the sys-
tematic killings in Rodrigo Duterte’s ‘war on drugs’ in the Philippines, in which 
evidence of crimes against humanity as understood under the 1998 Rome 
Statue exists, the UK completed an arms deal worth £1.7 million in 2016. This 
suggests that there is a weak or non-existent relationship between the UK’s 
responsibility to prevent mass atrocity and the pursuit of self-interest in the 
arms trade.136 Moreover, there is increasing evidence of a relationship between 
the arms trade and increased incidence of political violence. For example, a 
multivariate binomial study of political violence between 1967 and 1997 in 
Africa showed that arms transfers were significant and positive predictors of 
an increased probability of political violence and war, including mass atrocity 
crimes.137 Consequently, there is a general assessment that there is a lack of 
attempt at actually reducing arms production or to sufficiently control trade in 
light of heightened mass atrocity risk.138
Some authors have expressed concern that a focus on how the international 
community can carry out its responsibility to prevent will have an unintended 
consequence of downplaying, or even weakening, local resistance and resil-
ience to atrocities – taking agency away from the potential victims, making 
problem states accountable to the international community, rather than to the 
local population, and focusing on international community rescue, which will 
135 Nina Jorgensen, ‘State Responsibility for Aiding or Assisting International Crimes in the 
Context of the Arms Trade Treaty’, American Journal of International Law, 108(4): 722–749 
(2014).
136 Adrian Gallagher, Euan Raffle, and Zain Maulana, ‘Failing to Fulfill the Responsibility to 
Protect: The War on Drugs as Crimes Against Humanity in the Philippines’, The Pacific 
Review (2019). On-line First: https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2019.1567575.
137 Cassidy Craft and Joseph Smaldone, ‘The Arms Trade and the Incidence of Political 
Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1967–97’, Journal of Peace Research, 39(6): 693–710 (2002).
138 David B. Kopel, Paul Gallant, and Joanne D. Eisen, ‘The Arms Trade Treaty: Zimbabwe, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Prospects for Arms Embargoes on Human 
Rights Violators’, Penn State Law Review, 114(3): 891–954 (2010); Paul Holtom and Mark 
Bromley, ‘The International Arms Trade: Difficult to Define, Measure, and Control’, Arms 
Control Association, 2 July 2010. Available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_07-
08/holtom-bromley, accessed 15 April 2020; Elli Kytömäki, ‘The Arms Trade Treaty’s 
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prevent people from rescuing themselves.139 Moreover, some prevention activ-
ities by external actors, like training local actors on human rights, could well 
remove local agency and resilience.140 In response, we agree that it is certainly 
problematic to view the international community as rescuer and saviour, given 
the ways in which the international community has contributed to the vio-
lence from which it wishes to save people. To be clear, our focus on the interna-
tional community is not intended to take attention away from local resistance 
to atrocities. Instead, given the prominent role the international community 
has in assisting states with their R2P duties, we have simply aimed to show 
some ways in which the international community could better support local 
resilience through modified global systems. In other words, if the international 
community is already damaging local resilience by its ongoing global activi-
ties, such as arming belligerents or violent groups, then in the name of preven-
tion we need to seriously reconsider the role that the international community 
plays in increasing risk, violence, and mass atrocity.
Lastly, an expected critique of our argument would be that it suffers from 
a number of feasibility constraints, which renders the types of reforms we 
have suggested unrealistic and unrealisable. For example, the UN has tried 
to institutionalise conflict prevention in the Secretariat since the 1980s, yet 
it has received little funding support or political will from member states. 
Furthermore, there have been numerous formal amendments in efforts to bet-
ter regulate the arms trade, yet many signatories continue to exploit loopholes 
and actively sidestep compliance.
In response, we think it is important to make a distinction between illumi-
nating a particular lacuna within the R2P lexicon and offering thoroughgoing 
reforms to address this gap. Although not mutually exclusive, they are different 
activities with separate objectives. Moreover, logically speaking, the identifi-
cation of existing weaknesses in R2P would necessarily need to precede any 
recommendations for reform. In our case, the effort here has been to merely 
expose what we see as a major oversight within current R2P prevention dis-
cussions and to give some examples of where meaningful reforms could take 
place. Thus, we have not claimed that the aforementioned reforms are either 
feasible or likely, that is beyond the scope of this article. Our claim is simply 
139 Mahmood Mamdani, ‘Responsibility to Protect or Right to Punish?’ Journal of Intervention 
and Statebuilding, 4(1): 53–67 (2010); Frederic Mégret, ‘ICC, R2P, and the International 
Community’s Evolving Interventionist Toolkit’, Finnish Yearbook of International Law, 21: 
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to Protect”’, Review of International Studies, 36(1): 79–96 (2010).
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that reforms in the aforementioned sectors will be necessary if long-term R2P 
prevention strategies are to meet any meaningful sufficiency standard. While 
we appreciate the practical difficulties that this involves, we believe it is still 
crucial to outline a normative compass from which practice should be guided.
5 Conclusion
Prevention is increasingly viewed as crucial in R2P (whether because it is 
cheaper or more morally acceptable than reaction), but that prevention is 
often understood short-term and focused on fixing problems at the local level. 
Long-term prevention is acknowledged as part of R2P, but largely bypassed in 
discussions on operationalisation. We have argued that this is a major short-
coming of the current prevention paradigm and thus represents a considerable 
failure in the international community’s responsibility to protect under Pillar 
ii. This article has further argued that the international community’s commit-
ment to atrocity prevention should go beyond early warning mechanisms and 
capacity-building activities such as human rights training in problem states. 
This is not to say that these aspects of prevention are not necessarily useful, 
but early warning mechanisms can still be insufficient, or potentially narrow 
in what they address, and human rights training can be similarly narrow in 
its understanding of how to prevent atrocities. In response, we set out some 
evidence which suggests that global poverty and inequality are correlated with 
violent conflict (of the type that greatly increases the determinants of mass 
atrocity), and further argue that the international community has a respon-
sibility to prevent atrocities by operationalising long-term root cause pre-
vention, which address systemic issues such as poverty and inequality. This 
includes addressing the international community’s own role in perpetuating 
systemic conditions of economic deprivation which can lead to violence and 
mass atrocity. Without doing this, R2P is only responding to symptoms of cri-
ses, not addressing the root causes.
Finally, we offered some suggestions for how to ‘operationalise’ long-term 
prevention measures that address global, rather than local, root causes. While 
these measures may not all be linked clearly to specific atrocity acts, it has been 
argued that there is enough of a link to make these measures necessary. If the 
international community is unwilling to offer better terms of trade, to reduce 
arms sales, to stop demanding unjust financial conditions, to stop incentivising 
reduced social protection in problem states, and unwilling to force their trans-
national corporations to alter problematic behaviour, then the international 
community will be rightly treated with suspicion. Particularly when they send 
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people to offer human rights training, or suggest a sanctions regime, or drop 
bombs – all in the name of protecting the vulnerable.
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